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Abstract 
The following paper tested a hypothesis postulating that increases in People’s Republic 
of China exports of the given products to African countries, in this case South Africa, 
Kenya and Uganda, in any given year(s) between 2007 and 2017 would always 
correlate with decreases in Japanese exports of the specified six products to the three 
countries studied. Each country’s product set was chosen on the basis of the two 
products being primarily imported from Japan in the initial year of study, and 
subsequently seeing Chinese growth between then and 2017. The findings of the paper 
point to uneven results among the countries, with more incidences of an inverse 
correlation towards China’s gain in South Africa (5/22) and Kenya (6/22), and the 
reverse in the case of Uganda (7/22). However, there were more incidences of 
correlated movement (mutual growth and mutual declines) across all countries than 
inverse movements, bringing the totals to a threshold-passing 35/66 (p>33) for the 
former and 24 for the latter. The study indicates a general lack of a zero-sum game 
overall as the two Asian states’ exports into the three African countries’ markets on the 
continent have no direct impact on one another. 
 
Keywords: TICAD; FOCAC; Japan-Africa trade; China-Africa trade; new scramble 
for Africa; Belt and Road Initiative; Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
 
Introduction 
 
The period between 2000 and 2007 saw an exponential increase in China-Africa economic ties, 
which have subsequently grown in the decade since. These economic relations were especially 
heightened after the 2008 financial crisis. Overall, China-Africa trade grew by an average of 
20% per year to US$188-billion in the period between 2007 and 2017, with imports and exports 
more or less growing at the same pace, while Chinese FDI into Africa grew by 40%, to 
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approximately US$32-billion in the same time frame.1 On the other hand, Japan was hard hit 
by the crisis, with economic growth declining in 2008, 2009 and 2011, and reaching virtual 
stagnation in their entire period; growing only by 0.66% while China grew by 8.78% in the 
same timeframe (see Table 1). Further, a litany of literature argues that due to historical and 
geostrategic reasons, the two countries are engaged in a state of competition with one another. 
Moreover, China is argued to be ahead of Japan, despite the latter having formed TICAD 
(Tokyo International Conference on African Development) about a decade prior to the former’s 
FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation). Both countries are arguably instrumentalizing 
their aid tethers to gain access to the African countries’ resources, as well as access to their 
import markets in somewhat of a zero-sum game. On the basis of this literature, the present 
paper postulated the following hypothesis: increases in PRC imports of the given products in 
the given year(s) always correlate with decreases in Japanese imports of the same products in 
the same recipient country. Specifically, the following hypotheses were tested: 
 
H1: All increases in PRC exports to the given country co-occur with decreases in 
Japanese exports of the given product in the given year(s); 
H2: No decreases in PRC and Japanese exports of the given product(s) to the given 
country in any given year(s) can mutually occur. 
 
It is worth noting that the three products per country studied in this study are not the top three 
products which these countries imported over the period of study. Neither are they necessarily 
the top three products which these countries import from Japan or China. Rather, the products 
studied are those which at the first year of study (2007) were principally imported from Japan 
by the respective African countries, and which were subsequently imported more from China. 
The findings of the paper point to uneven results among the countries, with more incidences of 
an inverse correlation to China’s exclusive gain in South Africa (5 out of 22) and Kenya (6 out 
of 22), and the reverse in the case of Uganda (7 of 22). However, there were a total of more 
incidences of mutual movements (mutual growth and mutual declines) across all three 
countries than inverse movements, bringing the totals to a threshold-passing 35 out of 66 (i.e., 
more than 33) for the former and 24 for the latter. The study indicates a general lack of a zero-
                                                            
1 Rose, Caroline. “Discourses on Japan and China in Africa: Mutual Mis-Alignment and the Prospects 
for Cooperation,” Japanese Studies, 32 no 2 (2012): 219. 
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sum game overall as the two Asian states’ exports into the three countries on the continent have 
no direct impact on one another. On the main, however, the findings of the paper point to the 
lack of a general replacement of Japan by the PRC in vehicle exports in the period between 
2007 and 2017. There was, however, a total surpassing of Japan by the PRC in this period in 
all three countries of non-vehicle exports; ceramic products in South Africa (from 2009), iron 
and steel imports in Kenya (from 2015) and construction equipment in Uganda (from 2012). 
None of these were reversed by 2017. In the timeframe, the Japanese exports of these products 
have manifested some volatile patterns, with growths and declines, whereas the PRC has 
largely consistently grown. This means that on a year-on-year basis, there may be instances of 
mutual growth of Japanese imports to the countries with those of China, but on the decade-
long timeframe, there has been an overall surpassing of Japan by the PRC in these three non-
vehicle products, which had originally been dominated by Japan. Further, China not only 
overtook Japan in what were import sectors dominated by it in these countries, it also developed 
a differential market in which it is increasingly growing which forms its third most critical 
import into Kenya especially, but in which Japan has virtually no import activity; locomotives 
and rail. 
The first section of the paper will give a brief literature review, surveying the body of work on 
the effects, outcomes and dynamics of Japanese and Chinese relations with the continent of 
Africa, and some of the literature which has emerged arguing that the two countries are engaged 
in competition for influence at each other’s expense. The second section will give an account 
of the methodology to be used in the paper, along with a description of the dataset. The third 
will give an analysis of the data. The paper will subsequently note some conclusions which can 
be reached on the basis of the data analyzed. 
Literature review 
China and Japan’s relations with Africa 
 
Within Japan, many acknowledge that role of China as a key player in Japan’s economic 
rebound in the ten-year period since the 2008/9 global recession. But “with China’s growing 
economy overtaking Japan’s in size in 2010, its rising military strength, and its deepening 
relations with other states, they increasingly view China as a competitor.”2 Moreover, Africa 
                                                            
2 Chung, Chien-Peng. “China-Japan Relations in the Post-Koizumi Era: a Brightening Half-decade?,” 
Asia-Pacific Review, 19 no 1 (2012.): 88. 
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is seen as one site of contestation. As with China, Japan’s relations with Africa did not merely 
emerge after World War II, but rather date as far back as the nineteenth century following a 
decision to set up in the Cape by a subsidiary of the Japanese trading company Mikado Shokai, 
thereby inaugurating it is a small but significant exporter of textiles for Japanese consumers.3 
But in the contemporary sense, Japan initiated its economic relations with African countries in 
the post-war era, and in the process even attempted to enroll the British as the presiding, albeit 
declining, colonial power in Japan’s African countries of interest, especially Ghana (known at 
the time as the Gold Coast) and Nigeria.4 Indeed, Ampiah further notes that “both the Nobusuke 
Kishi and the Hayato Ikeda administrations of 1957–1960 and 1960–1964, respectively, were 
keen to further Japan’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa.” Japan’s involvement in sub-Saharan 
Africa properly took off and “became more than cursory” after 1965 following the initiation of 
an Official Development Assistance (ODA) program aimed at the sub region.5 
 
The relations were not without some friction, however. For example, there was a tiff between 
Ghana and Japan that was caused by the “burgeoning trade imbalance” leaning towards Japan’s 
favour.6 
 
There were similar trade-related issues between Japan and Nigeria throughout the 1960s. 
By 1961, Japan was far ahead of its major competitors in the textile trade in Nigeria. 
The huge balance of payment in Japan’s favour as a result of the lopsided trade relations 
led to the invocation of GATT Article 35 against Tokyo. Japan’s response to the ban 
on imports from Tokyo was the offer of a £10 mn loan aid to Lagos, not realising what 
problems this might cause. The loan was interpreted as tied aid by Lagos, which 
generated further tensions between the two countries, forcing Japan to send a fifteen-
man delegation to Nigeria in 1965 in an attempt to bring closure to the situation.7 
                                                            
3  Ampiah, Kweku. “Anglo-Japanese Collaboration about Africa in Early 1960s: The Search for 
‘Complementarity’ in the Middle of Decolonisation,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 39 no 2, (2011): 269. 
4 Ampiah, “Anglo-Japanese Collaboration,” 269. 
5 Cornelissen, Scarlett. “Japan’s ‘Africa thrust’,” South African Journal of International Affairs, 6 no 1, 
(1998): 256. 
6 Ampiah, “Anglo-Japanese Collaboration,” 269. 
7 Ampiah, ““Anglo-Japanese Collaboration,” 287. 
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These issues did not preclude, however, Japan’s development of an economic policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa. The primary focus of this was to secure minerals as well as a consumer 
market in the continent. Loans were extended by Japan to Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania and later Ghana.8 “Importantly, these early disbursals were made in response to the 
strict import restrictions on Japanese goods by these countries — countries with whom Japan 
had built up sizeable trade surpluses at that time.”9 Therefore, this ODA from Japan could be 
portrayed as a kind of “political quid pro quo.”10 For context, these disbursals were somewhat 
minor – in the early 1970s, these totaled around less than two percent of Japan’s total ODA, 
with most of it concentrated in Southeast Asia.11 By the mid-1990s, however, the Japanese aid 
machinery “had become well settled in sub-Saharan Africa: by 1995 Japan was disbursing aid 
to all of the 47 sub-Saharan African states, and it was the top donor for seven of these countries 
(Kenya, Ghana, the Gambia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, and Zambia).”12 
 
In the 1990s the Japanese government took its Africa policy to a new level through the 
formation of the TICAD process with the goal to “drive to draw the region into a system of 
enhanced trade and investment.”13 But by the dawn of the 2000s, another country was also 
working on a similarly ambitious and continent-wide platform of economic engagement; China. 
Beijing established the FOCAC in 2000, to much speculation that it was doing so with the aim 
of replicating what Japan had done in order to surpass it. 
 
Japanese and Chinese governmental initiatives in Africa since the 1990s – specifically 
Japan’s TICAD process and China’s more recent Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) summits – have cast a spotlight on the nature of Japanese and Chinese 
interests and objectives in Africa. In particular, the rapid increase in volumes of Chinese 
trade, aid and investment in Africa, in addition to a greater physical presence of Chinese 
residents in Africa, alongside an increase in awareness and popularity of China amongst 
African countries, are seen to be eclipsing Japan’s position in Africa.14 
                                                            
8 Cornelissen, “Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 7. 
9 Cornelissen,” Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 8. 
10 Cornelissen,” Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 8. 
11 Cornelissen, “Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 8. 
12 Cornelissen, “Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 8. 
13 Cornelissen, “Japan's ‘Africa thrust’,” 12. 
14 Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 219. 
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Indeed, China’s advance into Africa, especially since the early 2000s, has relatively overtook 
Japan’s activities on the African continent. To be sure, Japan’s two-way trade with Africa grew 
twofold from 2001 to 2009 and reached US$34.3-billion in 2008. However, the global 
economic crisis greatly undermined these gains and by nearly reducing them by 50% in 2009. 
However, the trade figure grew once again, to US$24-billion in 2010 (still around US$10.3-
billion short of its previous reach). This number appears thin in comparison to China’s own 
two-way trade with the continent, “which grew exponentially in the same period, and by 2010 
had reached nearly US$127 billion.”15 
Perhaps expectedly, the speed with which China has advanced in Africa has led to arguments 
in the literature and in popular media that these two countries (along with the United States and 
the European Union) are locked in a rivalry for access to “resources, power and influence in 
Africa,” and that Tokyo has been trying to play “catch up” with Beijing.16 Argues Davies 
 
If the Taiwan factor is discounted in China’s foreign policy toward the [African] 
continent, it is being replaced by growing strategic competition between China and 
Japan. In similar fashion to the China–Taiwan rivalry, intra-regional Asian political 
issues will play themselves out in Africa. But the competition is not for recognition but 
rather strategic influence in the broader international community.17 
 
As seen, in this perceived race to secure African trade and resources (the new scramble for 
Africa as it is sometimes labelled), Japan is seen to be lagging behind China. Davies, for 
example, believes that “the trend of Japan’s anxiety over China’s engagement of Africa is 
already clear.” 18  Similarly, Lehman suggests that “China’s expansion into Africa clearly 
worries the Japanese government since China clearly challenges Japan’s previous dominance 
                                                            
15 Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 220-221. 
16 Rose, Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 219. 
17 Davies, Martyn. How China Delivers Development Assistance to Africa’. Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
Stellenbosch, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies (2008): 56. 
18 Davies, How China Delivers, 57. 
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as the Asian model.” But Japan has not been inactive.19 To counter China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative, for example, some observers claim that Japan, with India, proposed the Asia-Africa 
Growth Corridor (AAGC).20 The two governments launched the initiative during the 52nd 
annual general meetings of the African Development Bank (AfDB) held in Gujarati’s capital 
of Gandhijinagar on May 24th 2017, with the hope that the project would be “a cheaper option 
and have a smaller carbon footprint when compared to China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative.”21 The following day, the two nations jointly presented a vision document for the 
project “that is largely meant to propel growth and investment in Africa, by curtailing the ever-
increasing presence of the Chinese on the continent.”22 The AAGC is an attempt to create a 
“free and open Indo-Pacific region” by rediscovering and creating new sea corridors that will 
link the African continent with India and countries in the South Asia and South East Asia sub-
regions as well as Oceania through both public and private efforts, with joint ventures and 
consortia to take up infrastructure, power and agribusiness projects in Africa. 23  Already 
Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore and Australia are on board and 
on the African side, Mozambique, Kenya, Djibouti and South Africa have expressed interest 
with plans being made to connect ports in Jamnagar, India with Djibouti in the Gulf of Aden. 
Additionally, ports of Mombasa and Zanzibar will be connected to ports near Mudarai; Calcutta 
will be linked to the Sittwe port in Myanmar.24 
 
As the above suggests, this perceived competition is not confined to Africa, as it is believed 
that China’s economic relationship with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian 
                                                            
19 Lehman, Howard P. “Introduction: The Global Politics of Japanese–African Relations,” in Howard 
Lehman, ed., Japan and Africa: Globalization and Foreign Aid in the 21st Century. New York: 
Routledge, (2010): 3. 
20 Nair, Avinash. “To Counter OBOR, India and Japan Propose Asia-Africa Sea Corridor.” The Indian 
Express, (2017, 31 May): A 1-2. 
21 Nair, “To Counter OBOR,” 2017. 
22 Nair, “To Counter OBOR,” 2017. 
23 Ndzendze, Bhaso. “Strains in Sino-Indian Relations: The BRICS Achilles’ Heel?,” Sigma Iota Rho 
Journal of International Relations Online, (November 2017) Retrieved from: 
http://www.sirjournal.org/research/2017/11/20/strains-in-sino-indian-relations-the-brics-achilles-heel 
(last accessed: 21 February 2019). 
24 Ndzendze, “Strains,” 1. 
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Nations (ASEAN) are increasingly closer than Japan-ASEAN relations. The 2002-signed 
ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has cut trade barriers and thereby enhanced 
economic relations among these countries, such that trade between China and the ASEAN 
countries accounted 15.2% of the latter’s total trade with external partners, while Japan, though 
not too far behind, still lagged at 10.5%. Thus, from its infancy, China’s free trade agreement 
with the ASEAN “aroused Japan’s fear of being marginalized in the region’s economy and 
diplomatic discourses.”25 
 
This line of thought is not without its questioners, however: 
 
“What Japan has been doing and what it intends to do in and for Africa must be taken 
not in the context of diplomatic rivalry between Japan and other actors but in the context 
of Japan’s willingness to fulfill its international responsibilities and hence to serve its 
broad and long-term national interests”26 
 
Rose further questions the ‘strategic rivalry’ school of thought, “by examining Japanese and 
Chinese academic studies of each other’s activities in Africa.” 
 
The overview of Japan’s China-in-Africa discourse, and China’s Japan-in-Africa 
discourse finds that each is often embedded within a more established discourse of 
Sino–Japanese relations. This, in the case of Japan, sees China’s exploits in Africa as 
part and parcel of the ‘rise of China’, and in some cases as an integral part of the ‘China 
threat (to Japan)’ debate. China’s Japan-in-Africa discourse interprets Japan’s revived 
interest in Africa under the TICAD IV umbrella as part of Japan’s quest to become a 
great power (in the face of a rising China), and in some cases as a threat to China’s own 
interests. There appears to be less interest and anxiety in Japan about China’s activities 
in Africa than some assessments infer, and that, by contrast, China’s Japan-in-Africa 
discourse shows a greater interest in, and in some cases suspicions of, Japan’s 
objectives in Africa.27 
 
                                                            
25 Chung, “China-Japan Relations,” 90-91. 
26 Hiroshi Kato. 2017. Japan and Africa: A Historical Review of Interaction and Future Prospects, Asia-
Pacific Review, 95. 
27 Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 219-220 
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Indeed, some argue that both are pursuing their own national interests in their dealings with 
Africa. Japan’s relationship with Africa is seen as being driven by its thirst for energy, markets 
and political support for its pursuit of a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.28 To be 
sure, “China has largely similar motives – energy needs, economic growth (through an export-
led strategy), political influence, and diplomatic gains in the form of recognition by the 
majority of African states of the PRC as the sole government of China.”29 This leaves some 
room for the validity of the competitiveness hypothesis, which this paper intends to test. 
 
Having reviewed the literature and noted claims of competition as well as claims of 
complementarity between the two Asian countries on the continent, this paper will seek to 
follow the work of Rose by testing out empirically, through (unlike Rose [2012]) quantitative 
methods, the extent to which the two countries are incompatible and in competition for market 
access in the continent. 
 
The paper will use the case studies of South Africa, Kenya and Uganda so as to gain case-
specific findings. These two countries could perhaps also offer generalizable insights of the 
countries which are at three different levels, with South Africa serving as an example of a 
middle-income economy ($3,996 to $12,375), Kenya meanwhile is a lower middle-income 
economy  ($1,026 to $3,995) and Uganda is an emerging lower income economy ($1,025 or 
less) by World Bank rankings.30 Furthermore, Kenya and Uganda are both in the same time 
region and will thus allow for a semi-regional description and overview of the trade relations. 
The choice of these three countries was governed by data availability; for example, there was 
as a lack of product type in which Japan had been the principal exporter in the majority of other 
countries surveyed. The cases will not, therefore, be taken to be generalizable to the continent’s 
more than 50 countries, many of whom could have differentiated relations with both Japan and 
China. Rather, the facts of these findings will be used to distil the extent to which the “new 
scramble for Africa” is true for at least these three countries, two of whom are also the biggest 
economies in their respective regions and had had a certain class of goods, prior to 2008/9, 
comparatively sourced more from Japan than China, but which subsequently saw a growth in 
                                                            
28 Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 95. 
29 Rose, “Discourses on Japan,” 221-222 
30  World Bank, “World Bank Country and Lending Groups.” Retrieved from:  
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519-world-bank-country-and-lending-
groups (last accessed: 25 August 2019). 
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Chinese-sourced imports in subsequent years. The methodology for doing so is unpacked 
below. 
 
Methodology 
 
The method of inquiry used in this paper involves a “before/after” test which will see Japan’s 
top three imports to each country from 2007, when it was the more voluminous importer, to 
2017 be compared to the movements in those of the PRC. The marginal decline or growth rate 
of Japan’s imports for all three will be traced along this time series, while also being compared 
to that of the PRC. The purpose will be to ascertain whether or not there is a correlation wherein 
Japan’s imports decline as those of the PRC increase, and vice versa. 
 
Variables 
The independent variable in this study is the movement in South African and Egyptian imports 
of Chinese goods in what were Japan-dominated import sectors in 2007, whereas the dependent 
variable are the comparative imports into Kenya and South Africa between US and China, 
specifically decrease or increase in US imports into these countries subsequent to increases or 
decreases in Chinese imports into the same markets. In this way, the dependent variable is 
operationalized as the total annual South African/Kenyan imports as measured in US dollars in 
the time period. 
 
As the above description suggests, the paper is characterized by an invariance on the 
independent variable, and variance on the dependent variable. The paper therefore uses a most 
similar approach, in which two or more cases with similar independent variables, but may yield 
different outcomes (i.e., in one country there could be a reverse correlation between Japan and 
China’s exports into these import sectors, while in another there may be linear correlations) are 
studied. Additionally, within the cases there is potential for variance, particularly among the 
three different products (i.e., there may be reverse correlation for one to two of the products, 
and none for the remainder). In addition to leading to results about each of the case studies, it 
also ensures against bias in selection of cases. 
 
The conditions for case selection in this paper were determined by the existence of a sector 
which during 2007 was dominated by Japan compared to China; in other words, these two 
countries were selected since they both had nominally Japan-dominated markets in the relevant 
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import sectors as at the first year of study. Additionally, as the literature review suggested, they 
have both had closer political and commercial relations with Japan. 
 
The postulated causal mechanism in this study are the differentiated growth rates of Japan and 
China as well as China’s foreign policy in the 2000s, which has seen it increasingly trained 
towards Africa. The former is evinced by differential GDP growth rates of the two countries in 
the period, as represented in Table 1. 
 PRC GDP 
growth 
rate (in %) 
Japan GDP 
growth rate 
(in %) 
2007 14.2 2.2 
2008 9.6 -1.0 
2009 9.2 -5.5 
2010 10.6 4.7 
2011 9.5 -0.5 
2012 7.9 1.4 
2013 7.8 1.6 
2014 7.3 0.4 
2015 6.9 1.4 
2016 6.7 0.9 
2017 6.9 1.7 
Totals 96.6 7.3 
Average 8.78 0.66 
 
Table 1. The GDP growths of the PRC and Japan in the 2007-2017 period. 31 Averages 
calculated by author. 
 
The latter is seen in a number of initiatives undertaken by China which indicate at Africa’s 
importance to China. To begin with, China formed the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC), along with the growth in loans from the Chinese state-affiliated Chinese 
                                                            
31 Sources: Country Economy (https://countryeconomy.com/gdp/japan?year=2017) for data on Japan 
and Knoema for data on the PRC. Available at: https://knoema.com/atlas/China/Real-GDP-growth 
(Both last accessed: 8 December 2018) 
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Development Bank (CDB) and the China Import-Export (Exxim) Bank. This growth in China-
Africa relations is also captured in the fact that its trade relations with the countries on the 
continent have increasingly grown; increasing from US$10.6-billion in 2000 to US$170-billion 
in 2017 (McKinsey, 2015; MOFCOM, 2018). Further, Chinese interest in African countries 
have seen it eagerly pursue its One China policy on the continent, and forge relations with 
seven new states which had previously recognized Taiwan. These include Liberia (2003), 
Senegal (2005), Chad (2006), Malawi (2007), Gambia (2015), São Tomé and Príncipe (2016) 
and Burkina Faso (2018). 
 
These causal mechanisms, in combination, provide basis to postulate a growth in Chinese 
interest in the Chinese market. Further, the former, points towards a potential causal pathway 
through which China could be poised to enact a comparative advantage vis-à-vis Japan in 
African markets. 
 
On the basis of this, the following hypothesis is postulated: increases in PRC imports of the 
given products in the given year(s) always correlate with decreases in Japanese imports. From 
this, we postulated two hypotheses: 
 
H1: All increases in PRC exports to the given country co-occur with decreases in 
Japanese exports of the given product in the given year(s); 
H2: No decreases in PRC and Japanese exports of the given product(s) to the given 
country in any given year(s) can mutually occur. 
 
 
Caveats 
It is worth noting that the three products studied in this study are not the top three products 
which these countries import. Neither are they necessarily the top three products which these 
countries import from Japan or China. For South Africa, its three principal imports from China 
include electrical machinery and equipment (valued at US$4.048,192-billion in 2017), 
machinery and mechanical appliances (valued at US$ 3.002,035-billion in 2017), and footwear 
(totaling  US$ 522.948-milion in 2017), and from Japan commodities not elsewhere specified 
(valued at US$711.145-million in 2017), Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, 
and parts and accessories thereof (valued at US$ 760.598-million in 2017). This product also 
happens to match the criteria for being studied here. The third product set included machinery, 
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mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof (valued at US$ 608.212-million 
at the end of 2017). For Uganda, the three principal imports from China included electrical 
machinery and equipment and parts thereof (valued at US$191.442-million in 2017), 
machinery and mechanical appliances (valued at US$164.591-million in 2017), and iron and 
steel (valued at US$56.365-million in 2017) and from Japan included vehicles other than 
railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof (valued at US$212.778-
million in 2017), and machinery, mechanical appliances, nuclear reactors, boilers (valued at 
US$83.654-million in 2017) as well as iron and steel (valued at US$51.631-million  in 2017). 
For Kenya, the three principal imports from China include machinery and mechanical 
appliances (valued at US$757.301-million in 2017), electrical machinery and equipment 
(valued at US$633.807-million in 2017), and railway and tramway locomotives (valued at 
US$497.147-million in 2017) and from Japan include vehicles other than railway or tramway 
rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof (valued at US$513.082-million in 2017), iron 
and steel (valued at US$ 158.885-million  in 2017), and machinery, mechanical appliances, 
nuclear reactors, boilers; parts thereof (valued at US$ 50.606-million in 2017). Subsequent 
growths or declines for these are not the subject of study in this paper. Rather, those studied 
are products which, at the first year of study (2007) were principally imported from Japan by 
the respective African countries, and which subsequently saw growth in Chinese imports for at 
least a single year in the period. 
 
Case Study Analyses 
 
Dataset description 
The dataset is composed of imports by South Africa, Kenya and Uganda across three import 
sectors which at least by 2007 were comparatively dominated by Japan, but which have 
subsequently seen a growing PRC import activity. The data is derived from the International 
Trade Centre’s Trademap whose available database currently carries import and export data 
for all countries in the United Nations, ranging from 2001 to 2017 at the present.32 The dataset 
                                                            
32  For South African imports from Japan, see: 
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c710%7c%7c392%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1 and for South African imports from the PRC, see: 
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c710%7c%7c156%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1. For Kenyan imports from the Japan, see: 
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c404%7c%7c392%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1 and for Kenyan imports from the PRC, see: 
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is corroborated by the World Bank, and the various government statistical offices, in this case 
the South African Department of Trade and Industry, the Ugandan Ministry of Trade Industry 
and Cooperatives, the Kenyan Ministry of Industry, Trade And Cooperatives, the Japanese 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Commerce of the People's 
Republic of China (MOFCOM). 
 
Country-specific data: South Africa 
In the case of South Africa, the top three Japan-dominated import markets as at the year 2007 
were vehicles, ceramic products, and rubber (and articles of rubber). The respective values and 
their subsequent growths or declines through to the year 2017 are summarized in tables 2 
(vehicles), 3 (ceramic products), and 4 (rubber products). The comparative movement of these 
is analyzed below. 
Product 1: Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 1,376,663 1,239,323 820,299 1,207,859 1,130,996 1,000,383 845,126 835,957 724,832 655,479 760,598 
PRC 432,072 380,101 169,659 351,462 419,008 483,679 414,513 392,521 336,935 278,898  372,643 
 
Table 2. Dataset of total annual South African imports of vehicles from Japan and the PRC 
between 2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
As Table 2 shows, Japan’s exports of vehicles into South Africa began at a baseline of 
US$1,376,663, and subsequently declined for the next two years, 2008 and 2009, in a row to 
US$1,239,323 and US$820,299, respectively. These then grew in 2010 to US$1,207,859, and 
declined in 2011 toUS$1,130,996 and continuously declined for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 
2016, reaching a dataset low of US$655, 479. In 2017, there was a rebound to US$760,598. 
 
                                                            
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c404%7c%7c156%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1. For Ugandan imports from Japan see: 
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c800%7c%7c392%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1 and for Ugandan imports from the PRC, see: 
https://www.trademap.org/Bilateral_TS.aspx?nvpm=1%7c800%7c%7c156%7c%7cTOTAL%7c%7c
%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c2%7c1%7c1%7c1%7c1. All datasets last accessed: 21 February 2019. 
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The Japanese imports and PRC imports experienced inversely correlated growths in 2011 and 
2012 with PRC imports growing while those of Japan declined in 2011 and 2012. Conversely, 
there was no inversely correlated growth in Japanese imports and decline in PRC imports. 
Mutual growth did occur however in 2017, while mutual declines did occur in 2007, 2008, 
2014, 2015, and 2016. Overall, then, there have been two continuous periods of inverse 
correlation, in the favour of the PRC, and none in that of Japan, and a total of six non-
continuous periods of mutual decline and two in favor of mutual growth. 
 
Product 2: Ceramic products 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 163,453 117,187 40,907 68,256 62,179  26,218  29,835 27,211  23,706  20,087  18,897 
PRC 124,427  123,467 109,580 160,620 183,873 197,884 215,415 182,494 185,985 168,313 155,806 
 
Table 3. Dataset of total annual South African imports of ceramic products from Japan and the 
PRC between 2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
According to Table 3, in 2007, South African imports of Japanese ceramic products were 
valued at US$163,453, and declined to US$117,187 the following year and further declined to 
US$40,907 in 2009. There was an increase to US$68,256 in 2010, a decrease to US$62,179 in 
2011. This was then followed by a decline, with Japanese imports to South Africa decreasing 
to US$26,218 in 2012. These rebounded to US$29,835in 2013, and continuously declined 
between 2014 and 2017, reaching US$18,897 in 2017. On the other hand, Chinese imports of 
ceramic products into South Africa decreased from a baseline of US$124,427 in 2007 to 
US$123,467 in 2008. There was another decline to US$109,580 in 2009. There was a 
continuous growth between 2010 and 2013, from US$160,620 to US$215,415. 2014 saw 
decline to US$182,494, while 2015 saw a recovery to US$185,985. 2016 and 2017 had two 
consecutive declines to US$168,313 and US$155,806 respectively. 
 
Co-occurrence of increase in Chinese and decrease in Japanese imports to South Africa of 
ceramic products took place in 2011, 2012, and 2015. No increases in Japanese imports co-
occurred with declines in Chinese imports. On the other hand, mutual declines occurred in 2008, 
2009, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017 while mutual increases co-occurred in 2010 and 2013. 
 
Country-specific data: Kenya 
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Product 1: Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock, and parts and 
accessories thereof 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 411,025 425,889 361,198 435,440 383,264 434,936 522,020 634,137 609,491 539,297 513,082 
PRC 84,444 97,532 83,167 98,222 116,277 162,903  213,269 254,354  347,771  159,498  186,848 
Table 4. Dataset of total annual Kenyan imports of Vehicles from Japan and the PRC between 
2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
As detailed in Table 4, in 2007, Kenyan imports of Japanese vehicles were valued at 
US$411,025, and increased to 2008 to US$425,889. There was then a decrease to US$361,198 
in 2009. A rebound to US$435, 440 in 2010 was followed by a decline to US$383, 264. There 
was then continuous growth from 2012 to 2014, peaking at US$634,137. There was then a 
continuous decline from 2015 through to 2017, reaching US$513, 082. On the other hand, 
Chinese imports of vehicles to Uganda saw growth to US$97, 532 in 2008 from a baseline of 
US$5,436 in 2007. There was a decline to US$83, 167, and a rebound to US$98, 222 in 2010 
that continued to grow continuously until 2015 when it reached US$347, 771. In 2016 there 
was decline to US$159, 498 and growth in 2017 to US$186. 484. 
 
Growth of Chinese imports of vehicles into Uganda co-occurred with decreases in Japanese 
imports of the same product in 2009, 2011, and 2013, whereas the inverse occurred in 2008 
and 2015. Mutual growths did not occur. Mutual declines occurred in 2010, and 2017. 
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Product 2: Iron and steel 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 51,824 79,649  62,413  76,725  129,383  105,029 192,610  173,016  155,391  130,915  158,885 
PRC 27,029 51,028  27,280  29,398  36,442  50,249  65,642  144,873  199,186  208,221  188,031 
Table 5. Dataset of total annual Kenyan imports of iron and steel from Japan and the PRC 
between 2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
As Table 5 shows, in 2007, Kenyan imports of Japanese iron and steel were valued at 
US$51,824 and increased in 2008 to US$79,649. There was then a decrease to US$62,413 in 
2009. A rebound to US$76,725 in 2010, and US$129, 383 in 2011 was followed by a decline 
to US$105,029 in 2012. There was then continuous decline from 2014 to 2016, when they 
reached US$130, 915. 2017 saw a rebound to US$158, 885. On the other hand, Chinese imports 
of iron and steel to Kenya saw growth to US$51,028 in 2008 from a baseline of US$27,029 in 
2007. There was a decline to US$27,280, and a rebound to US$29,398, 222 in 2009 and 2010 
respectively. This growth trend continued, with Ugandan import of Chinese iron and steel 
irreversibly surpassing those of Japan in 2015, through to 2016 when it reached US$208,221, 
and declined to US$188,031 in 2017. 
 
Growth of Chinese iron and steel into Uganda co-occurred with decreases in Japanese imports 
of the same product in 2012, 2014, 2015, and 2016, whereas the inverse occurred in 2017 only. 
Mutual growths occurred in 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2013. Mutual declines occurred only in 
2009. 
 
Country-specific data: Uganda 
In the case of Uganda, the top two Japan-dominated import markets as at the year 2007 were 
vehicles and construction equipment. The respective values and their subsequent growths or 
decline through to the year 2017 are summarized in tables 4 (vehicles) and 5 (construction 
equipment). The comparative movement of these is analyzed below. 
 
Product 1: Vehicles 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 163,213 163,281 195,002 241,144 257,048 262,299 267,971 277,594 240,445 170,999 212,778 
PRC 14,786 21,507  21,043  18,222  30,634 70,595  37,675  51,006  65,471  63,251  41,467 
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Table 6. Dataset of total annual Ugandan imports of vehicles from Japan and the PRC between 
2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
As represented in Table 6, in 2007, Ugandan imports of Japanese vehicles were valued at 
US$163,213, and increased continuously from 2008 through 2014 where it peaked at 
US$277,594. There was then a decrease to US$240,445 in 2015, US$170,999 in 2016, and a 
growth to US$212, 778 in 2017. On the other hand, Chinese imports of vehicles into South 
Africa increased from a baseline of US$14,786 in 2007 to US$21,507 in 2008. There was a 
decline to US$21,043 in 2009, and US$18, 222 in 2010. There was a continuous growth 
between 2011 and 2012, from US$30,634 to US$70,595 respectively. 2013 saw a decline to 
US$37,675, while 2014 saw a recovery to US$51,006. In 2015, the imports rebounded to 
US$65, 251. 2016 and 2017 had declines to US$63,251 and US$41,467 respectively. 
 
Growth of Chinese imports of vehicles into Uganda co-occurred with decreases in Japanese 
imports of the same product in 2015, whereas the inverse occurred in 2009, 2010, 2013, and 
2017. Mutual growths occurred in 2008, 2011, 2012, and 2014. Mutual declines occurred in 
2016. 
 
Product 2: Construction equipment 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Japan 24,259 34,469 16,815 6,581 5,038 1 0 2,515 19,997 16,441 6,333 
PRC 5,436  225  297 283  4,391  15,989  25,394 10,045 7,675 15,590 11,613 
Table 7. Dataset of total annual Ugandan imports of construction equipment from Japan and 
the PRC between 2007 and 2017 (in ‘000 of US$). 
 
According to Table 7, in 2007, Ugandan imports of Japanese construction equipment were 
valued at US$24,259, and increased to 2008 to US$34,469. There was then a decrease to 
US$16,815 in 2009, and continuously so until 2013 where it reached US$0. From this, there 
was a growth to US$2,515 in 2014, US$19,997 in 2015, a decline to US$16, 441 and US$6, 
333 in 2016 and 2017 respectively. On the other hand, Chinese imports of construction 
equipment to Uganda saw continuous declines that reached US$283-thousand in 2010 from a 
baseline of US$5,436 in 2007. There was a rebound to US$4,391 in 2011, and US$15, 989 in 
2012, US$25, 394 in 2013. A decline to US$10, 045 and US$7, 675 in 2014 and 2015 
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respectively. A rebound to US$15,590 occurred in 2016 and was followed by a decline to 
US$11,613 in 2017. 
 
Growth of Chinese imports of construction equipment into Uganda co-occurred with decreases 
in Japanese imports of the same product in 2009, 2011, and 2013, whereas the inverse occurred 
in 2008 and 2015. Mutual growths did not occur. Mutual declines occurred in 2010, and 2017. 
 
Analysis of Findings 
The datasets for all three countries (South Africa, Kenya and Uganda) make a total of 66 
‘incidences’. Incidences in this paper are conceptualized as year-on-year shifts in which 
imports for either of the exporters could have either increased, decreased or remained unmoved, 
and similarly the balance between them. As it happens, in none of the years was there an 
incidence of non-growth or non-decline for either of the countries involved. For all the datasets, 
there were downward and upward movements for each year. As a comparative study, the 
hypothesis of the present paper will be answerable by determining the contrast in the 
movements; either towards mutual or inverse growths and/or declines for both the exporters – 
Japan and China – in all three African states, as well as noting whether at the tail end of the 
study (2012 to 2017), Japan had been replaced by the PRC as the principal import source for 
the countries and products, and whether such as a surpassing was maintained (as at the end of 
the dataset in the year 2017). 
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Figure 1. South African, Ugandan and Kenyan Imports from Japan vs the PRC, 2007-2017: 
Incidence summary. Author’s own calculations. 
The totality of the incidences for each country are summarized in Figure 1, while the mean 
scores for all 66 incidences across the four scenarios are summarized in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. South African, 
Ugandan and Kenyan Imports 
from Japan vs the PRC, 2007-
2017: Generalized incidence 
summary mean scores. Author’s 
own calculations. 
The paper postulated the following hypothesis: increases in PRC imports of the given products 
in the given year(s) always correlate with decreases in Japanese importation into these countries. 
From this, we postulated two hypotheses: 
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H1: All increases in PRC exports to the given country co-occur with decreases in 
Japanese exports of the given product in the given year(s); 
 
H2: No decreases in PRC and Japanese exports of the given product(s) to the given 
country in any given year(s) can mutually occur. 
 
The paper will now turn to assessing the extent of the veracity of each, with the aim of 
concluding on the more accurate, if any.  
 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis would be proven correct if the data yielded only results which showed 
inverse correlation between growths in the PRC imports of the product under study with 
declines in the Japanese imports for that year. In the case of South Africa and Uganda, 
respectively, the scenario hypothesized occurred 5, while for Kenya it 6 times. The inverse has 
not occurred for South Africa. For Kenya it came up to a total of 1 incidence, while for Uganda 
it occurred a total of 7 times. Thus, negative correlations of growths in the two countries’ 
exports into these countries came up to a total of 24 out of 66 possible incidences, in favor of 
China by 16 incidences. 
 
To prove or disprove the hypothesis, a minimum threshold in terms of the total incidences must 
be met; the hypothesized scenario (i.e., Chinese and Japanese imports being significantly 
negatively correlated) must occur in at least 51 percent of the scenarios. For the individual 
countries, the minimum threshold for the hypothesis to be proven is 11 (at least half of all the 
total combined imports by product, which totals at 22 since there were two product types being 
imported over a period of 11 years). 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis, related to the first but broader, postulated that no decreases or increases 
in PRC and Japanese imports of the given product(s) in the given year(s) could mutually occur. 
In other words, we should not within a single year and for a similar product find instances of 
mutual decline for both Japan and the PRC. Here the data presents the opposite case, across 
different points in the dataset. As seen in Figure 1 and 2, there have been 14 such incidences 
for South Africa, 13 for Kenya, and 8 for Uganda; bringing the total to 35. In this case, the 
critical level is 33 since the total possible scenarios total to 66; with a score beneath this 
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vindicating the hypothesis, and above it disproving the hypothesis. Since it is above 33, we can 
determine that the hypothesis is disproven; that is, at the gross level there is no overall inverse 
correlation between growth in PRC imports to South Africa, Kenya and Uganda in the 2007-
2017 period and their Japanese counterparts. There have been more incidences of Japanese and 
Chinese imports into Africa growing or declining together than moving in inverse correlations. 
 
This would appear to indicate that there is no zero-sum scenario to be detected between Japan 
and PRC imports, contrary to some of the literature and to the hypothesis laid out in the paper. 
The extent of the validity of this, as well as the workings of this apparent finding, are further 
discussed in the section below. 
 
A non-zero sum game: General findings discussed 
The findings of the paper point to the lack of a general replacement of Japan by the PRC in 
vehicle exports in the period between 2007 and 2017. There was, however, a total surpassing 
of Japan by the PRC in this period in all three countries of non-vehicle exports; ceramic 
products in South Africa (from 2009), iron and steel imports in Kenya (from 2015) and 
construction equipment in Uganda (from 2012). None of these were reversed by 2017. In the 
timeframe, the Japanese exports of these products have manifested some volatile patterns, with 
growths and declines, whereas the PRC has largely consistently grown. This means that on a 
year-on-year basis, there may be instances of mutual growth of Japanese imports to the 
countries with those of China, but on the decade-long timeframe, there has been an overall 
surpassing of Japan by the PRC in these three non-vehicle products, which had originally been 
dominated by Japan. Therefore, Chinese exports of these products into all 3 countries appears 
to be as a result of growth in China’s own export volumes to them, while those of Japan have 
comparatively grown slower than those of the PRC, and sometimes displayed massive reversals. 
Interestingly, the years of Japan’s GDP decline (2008, 2009 and 2011) were also correlated 
with declines in exports to South Africa and Kenya in vehicles, as well as the secondary 
products (ceramics in the case of South Africa in 2008, 2009 and 2010; and iron and steel in 
the case of Kenya in 2008, 2009, and 2011), while Uganda saw continued growths in these 
years in its vehicle imports, but declines in its secondary product (construction equipment in 
2009 and 2011). Thus some of Japan’s decline can be attributed to the general recessions seen 
in the country in these years, whereas China had corresponding growth levels of  9.6% to 
Japan’s -1% in 2008, 9.2% to Japan’s -5.5% in 2009 and 9.5% to Japan’s -0.5% in 2011. 
Further, China not only overtook Japan in what were import sectors dominated by it in these 
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countries, it also developed a differential market in which it is increasingly growing which 
forms its third most critical import into Kenya especially, but in which Japan has virtually no 
import activity; locomotives and rail. 
 
Implications 
From these findings we can observe that by the nature of their consistent growth, Chinese 
exports into Africa are bound to grow regardless of the status of their Japanese counterparts, 
which are in decline. To be sure, we can classify Japan as a major player in African countries, 
but a declining one. This is considering the fact that South Africa went from importing 8% of 
its total products in 2000 from Japan to only 3.5% by 2017. There has also been a decline in 
the share that Japan has in terms of South African exports. In 2000 South Africa exported 9.2% 
of its products to Japan but was exporting only about 5.1% in 2017. This nonetheless marks a 
real growth from US$2.8 billion to US$3.45 billion. But this is minimal. China claims a larger 
share of South African exports, having grown from 3.2% (US$1 billion) in 2000 and 10% 
(US$6.8 billion) currently. In the same period (2000 to 2018), China has grown to a total 19% 
share of the South African import market from only 3.8%.33 Similarly Japanese share of 
Kenyan imports declined from 6.5% (US$133 million) in 2000 to 5.9% in 2013, whilst China 
grew from 6.5% in 2000 to being its principal import partner at 23% in 2018.34 For Uganda, 
China-sourced imports grew from composing a total of 4.9% of Ugandan imports in 2000 to 
20% in 2018. At the same time, Japanese-sourced imports to Uganda grew from composing 
4.9% of Ugandan imports to 6.4% by 2018. By implication, therefore, given the non-zero-sum 
nature of access to these African countries, it is entirely possible that, all other things being 
equal, Japanese-sourced imports into these countries could rebound in tandem with the 
Japanese economy.35 This also indicates that further growth of trade partners, including intra-
African import partners (as intended by the ratification of the African Continental Free Trade 
Area in 2019) may not come at the expense of its present trade partners given the capacity of 
these markets to consume from multiple import partners. This is especially so given that they 
are experiencing higher than average population growth levels. 
                                                            
33 MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does South Africa import from? (2016),” MIT 
(2019). Retrieved from: https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/sitc/import/zaf/show/all/2016/ (last 
accessed: 25 August 2019). 
34 MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Kenya import from? (2018),” MIT 
(2019). Retrieved from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/ken/ (last accessed: 25 August 2019). 
35 MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity, “Where does Uganda import from? (2018),” MIT 
(2019). Retrieved from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/uga/ (last accessed: 25 August 2019). 
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Conclusion 
Using the case studies of South Africa, Kenya and Uganda between 2007 and 2017 in a 
simplistic hypothesis test, this paper sought to identify whether there is any validity to the 
notion that as Chinese imports into the African continent increased, they were directly 
correlated with a decrease in Japanese imports of the same products. Empirical evidence of a 
negative effect of increases in PRC-sourced imports on their Japanese counterparts into these 
three African states studied were found lacking, as it would appear that there is no zero-sum 
game to be spoken of, despite the prevalence of literature claiming it to exist – at least in the 
realm of export markets in the three countries studied. 
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